th century onward anticipate the 20 th -century mood of legal mapping. They classify legal arrangements by languages, races and genetic roots, then by their ideologies and technicalities. Later on they do so by separating the Western from the Soviet/socialist law, by their correspondence to underlying general cultures, as well as according to legal families. It is the insuffi ciency of resorting to dichotomy contrasting the Western "Us" to any differing Eastern "Others" that has recently resulted in typologising in terms of the dynamism and directions of legal development in the duality of professionalism and traditionalism or in the cross-reference of what is established/stable and unestablished/instable, and of what is drawn from Western and non-Western sources. Material taxonomy cannot be accomplished in law through genuine class-concepts. Characterisation through concepts of order can be achieved at most. In want of any meta-system, cultures formed to idealise and hypostasise ideas of order by independent principles can provide no common basis of division for law. Accordingly, only some division to major and minor sets and subsets can be achieved. The own arrangement will be better cognised by other schemes' understanding. The gradual transcendence of rule-fetishism by identifying law with some specifi c culture may prevent the coming "clash of civilizations" from reaching aggressive self-assertion and care for the sustainability of the laws' diversity.
Preliminaries
Applying a theatrical metaphor characteristic of the Baroque age, it is Leibniz' ambition (1667) regarding the early recognition of the need to describe the "theatre of the legal world" that was transmitted to us, informing us that the more humanity's intellectual world broadened throughout history, the more pressingly humanity felt the need to classify its diverse elements. For example, the English Saint German perceived the difference between Roman English laws, while also presenting the correlation between their development, as early as in 1531, pointing out that what is jus naturale in case of the former recurs as reason in the latter. Slavic Muslim -, which, despite being rather infl uential for a while as an early attempt, proved to be too sketchy and limited in outlines. However, at the peak of European imperialism or politicoeconomic expansion, this analysis theoretically encompassed the world through the historical prism of Europe. Interestingly enough, it also involved Arabic culture-having in mind its presence in the Hispanic Peninsula for centuries in the Middle Ages-as a partner on an equal footing. 6 We see here for the fi rst time the Germans separated as a block from the Roman legal tradition, perhaps owing to the clashes with which the German Empire, with the AustroHungarian Monarchy in the background, confronted the rest of the world. At least, there can scarcely be any other explanation in that allusion was also made to Hungarian law.
In another attempt at grouping, Sauser-Hall (1913) accepted the exclusive criterion of race as the principle for classifi cation, in a manner not alien to the dominant spirit of the age 7 -Aryan, Indo-European • Hindu-Iranian (Persian, Armenian)
• Celtic (Celtic, Gallic, Irish, Gaelic)
• Greco-Latin (Greek, Roman, Canonic, neo-Swiss)
• -, and his categorisation remains of a revealing force in several respects notwithstanding the fact that it keeps silence about the specifi c similarities and differences in the legal nature of the arrangements that he grouped so. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly provided a pioneer attempt at describing the known totality of legal regimes in both their historical development and actual diversity on the globe. Actually, he drew a comprehensive picture of the popular force that may have generated known cultures, inserting for the very fi rst time a "closing category" of visibly "mixed" contents in his scheme. He was also pioneering in drawing a broad and overall framework, albeit he too had a start from his own regime (labelled as the historical performance of peoples, to be identifi ed as "Western" in a cultural sense later on).
In this endeavour, he may have been guided by a logically inspired "aesthetical" wish that the borders of his own legal regime should not be defi ned too narrowly in separating it from the rest of the world. In the historical sequence of classifi cations, the categorisation of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic developments as members of a single group emerges as a recurrent feature, while the separation of Latinic-German Central Europe from Western Europe proper within the Romanist coverage is a novel recognition.
The series of classifi cations produced during the half-century following World War II was opened by a magnifi cent theoretical conspectus, authored by a triad in France. As is well known, the primary aim of Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff (1950) was to lay the theoreticalmethodological foundations of legal comparatism rather than to accomplish any description of the extent of the legal world. Accordingly, these authors excelled in elaborating private law as a group with criteria of categorisation given in a most promising manner. As an unavoidable by-product, however, they disregarded ideals of order (e.g. of the Far East) where any conceptualisation was abhorred. Eventually, they saw the historical evolution of private law in Europe as stemming from, and represented by, seven independent types. All in all, their classifi cation 11 -French German Scandinavian English Russian
Islamic Hindu -has (with its separation of the Nordic region 12 ) remained an exceptionally mature accomplishment for a long time.
David (1950), whose work in due course became the number one classic of the international comparative law movement, paved a somewhat different road. Although starting, too, with a dedication to civil law, he extended his research interests from the civil law technical instrumentality to entire legal arrangements as unities organised into a system, with various components gaining specifi c roles. In parallel with the rise of the Iron Curtain between East and West in Europe and the threat of nuclear devastation with the increased sense of danger through the menace of a Third World War, the ideology or philosophical worldview underlying the given legal regime became his primary concern for classifi cation, only to be seconded with the technique of law in supplementation.
13 His proposition- -, applying his typological model in order to outline a legal sociological panorama with a historical approach in the background. 16 Albeit being otherwise conservative as permeated by respect for traditional values, this typology may astonish us by presenting both the West and the anti-West, i.e. Bolshevism, with equal taxonomic weight, moreover, in a way mixed sublimely with arrangements originated in world religions that had in their time set our civilisational path for millennia. However, assessing the atmosphere of cosmic threats with expectations of a coming cataclysm, such western submissiveness still needs to be explained in terms of social psychology rather than in cool detachment with some apparent objectivity.
Yet, in the meantime the world opened itself up to the Western mind, and theoretically inspired attempts at a philosophical classifi cation emerged. In a classical manner, Northrop's typifi cation (1959) 17 -based on an understanding of the specifi cally Far Eastern-discerned the following groups: […] is to push legal codes into the background, preferably dispensing with them altogether, and to bring the disputants into a warm give-and-take relationship, usually by way of a mediator, so that previously made demands can be modifi ed gracefully, and a unique solution taking all the exceptional circumstances of the case into account is spontaneously accepted by both disputants. Codes there may be, but they are to be used only as a last resort, and even then recourse to them brings shame upon the disputants.
[…] Not only is there no resort to a legal rule; there is also no judge. Even the mediator refuses to give a decision. Instead, the dispute is properly settled when the disputants, using the mediator merely as an emissary, come to mutual agreement in the light of all the existential circumstances, past, present, and future.
[…] Not the abstract universals of a legal code, but the existential particularity of the concrete problematic situation […] is the criterion of the just and the good." At just about the same time a new upswing occurred also, due to reform initiatives addressed at classical comparative law. Schnitzer, as the pioneering fi rst, claimed (1961) 21 -after having revised his earlier suggestion (1945) 22 -that there were fi ve great blocks of civilisation- 18 Ibid. 184-185. As he remarks on 186, all this is akin to the radical empiricism and nominalism of Dewey, Kierkegaard, and Sartre as well, as "behind this intuitive, mediational type of law in Asia there is a Confucian, Buddhist and pre-Aryan Hindu epistemology which affi rms that full, direct and exact empirical knowledge of any individual, relation or event in nature reveals it to be unique". -is not only conclusive but also justifi ed, in as much as he clarifi es his pre-suppositions. Avoiding unifactorality (but presuming that differing results will ensue depending on whether public law or private law has been taken into consideration), the style of the overall legal system is selected as the basis of classifi cation, which is a compound of its (1) historical origin and (2) characteristic mode of thinking, as well as of its (3) legal institutions (especially in case of developed Western law) and (4) sources of law, taken together with their interpretation (especially in case of Islamic and Hindu laws), and, fi nally, also of the (5) ideological attributes underlying the ideal of the respective legal order (especially in case of laws with religious background or Socialist roots).
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As already remarked once, the Socialist (or, in its original inspiration, the Soviet) law appeared as a separate type in the work of DAVID, the fi rst author of the Cold War, as early as in 1950, and remained a recurrent component until the fall of the Socialist world system. Moreover, the term would also be utilised-in addition to instances of over-ideologisation or over-politicisation-through theoretical generalisation. • partial (Burma, Pakistan, Turkey)
• dictatorship behind a mere legal façade (Indonesia, Guinea)
• total chaos (Congo) Communist -, in which the dynamism of the intermediate sphere (with the value-orientation of the tendencies of development that may forecast recent directions) seems to be the most progressive element. Gorla (1963) substantiated the world's division into two, taken as the hegemony of one defi nite standard expected to be a force capable of suppressing anything else, while introducing in his typological foundation the concept that the opposition between the capitalist and the Socialist law overwhelms the one between the Civil Law and the Common Law. As he explicates by a lucid distinction- 27 As a doubtlessly number one authority, Szabó remarks that "it is the discrepancy of characteristics that prevails over formal similarities" The debate addressing the issue for a quarter of a century as to how much the distinctive features are expected to stem from a common basis and their ideological background-in addition to the separation of the distinctive ones from within a single entity-compelled the French master of post-war legal comparatism to change his stand defi nitely. Having left behind the community of ethos indicated by the category of "Western law", David then proposed (1964) the introduction of two mutually supplementing criteria, namely "legal technique" (including vocabulary, concepts, hierarchy of the sources of law and juridical methods) as well as "philosophical, political or economic principles desired to be implemented"-only providing that "[t]he two criteria are to be used subsequently and not in isolation."
30 Accordingly, he re-formulated his taxonomy, using the middle term of "legal family" [famille de droit] in the following way:
Albeit this separates what is obviously distinct from within the diverse formations (or Soviet deformations) of Western civilisation, yet in a scholarly indefensible manner it relegates everything non-Western into one single and improperly defi ned notional category. For indeed, any reference to "philosophical, religious or traditional" 31 laws is hardly more in the fi nal analysis than a mere pretext for separating what is "other" or "different". Following such logic, any comparatist-from the Far East via the Muslims to the Malagasy and Hova tribes in Madagascar-might arrange a cliché to group Berlin, Paris, Rome, London and New York into the same category of esoterica alongside with Moscow and Tirana.
So it is not by chance that critical self-refl ection had to continue. For instance, Rodière (1963) responded to the challenge by narrowing the circle of legal regimes to be classifi ed. -, which in fact is a version of the proposition by Zweigert in 1961, scarcely modifi ed but expressly worsened, as the Scandinavian law, put in-between the Anglo-American and the Socialist arrangements, is defi nitely cut from both its Romanist and Germanic roots. 36 The proliferation within a few decades of attempts bearing the marks of fashion may have discredited the undertaking itself and the merits of the whole enterprise; at least no new proposal could be heard about during the subsequent quarter of a century. Eörsi's distinction with sensitivity to civil law (1973) 37 represented again a Marxist historical perspective, while adding to Kulcsár's typology ("exploitative / Socialist") framed a decade agonatural communities
Socialist -, and excelling by the presentation of Anglo-American and Scandinavian laws in one common category as well as by the very naming of the Central and Southeast-European region. The other comparatist endeavours at the time mostly contributed to the clarifi cation of the fact that Common Law is a genuinely faithful heir of the richness of Roman law, nurturing exactly both from, and further on, its roots. (Ironically enough, this realisation coincided with the gradual relocation of the scholarly cultivation of Roman law from its one-time exclusivity in the Latin-Germanic region of Middle Europe to the Englishspeaking areas, calling for common law mentality as local sensitivity.) Accordingly, Schlesinger (1960) pointed out that "in spirit and method, and also in many particulars, classical Roman law is closer to the Common Law than to the modern civilian codes." Or, "in a common law system the case law, made binding by the doctrine of stare decisis, represents an element of stability, and [...] change is brought about mainly by statutory law. […] In the civil law, on the other hand, the codes provide some certainty (at least verbal certainty) and structural stability, while judicial »interpretation«, unfettered by a formal rule of stare decisis, constitutes an element of fl exibility." analogies in their policies of building an empire, and also in basic qualities of their legal habits. Customary law is paramount; the case law method, progress from case decision to case decision, prevails; a cautious tradition forms crude beginnings into refi ned justice, supported by the dualism of customary strict law and equitable practice of magistrates-jus civile and
In the last decade of the second millennium, some faint attempts at providing at least some didactic indication amongst altered conditions eventually re-emerged. The Czech Knapp was among the fi rst to dispense with Socialism (1991) and to acknowledge Western law had survived in its old dual form after the collapse of the Soviet empire- This is a basic truth according to which "The common law establishes its general principles by considering how a reasonable man would act in particular circumstances while the natural law method is to state general principles and then to assume that the reasonable man would act in accordance with them." Goodhart, A. L.: English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law. New York, 1949, 35.
It is to be noted how much the characterisation building on the Anglo-American reconstruction of the Roman legal tradition is more sophisticated and alive, compared to continental approaches exhausted by inductivity contrasted to deductivity. For instance, Pound's opinion that the "essential difference between the civil law and the common law is one not of substance but of method" was not interpreted simplistically by Lawson, F. H.: A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. Ann Arbor (MI), 1953, 46 (whereas "a code is not a necessary mark of a civil law system nor the absence of one a mark of a common law system") but all this is to signify a difference in the "type of mind", meaning that "a civil law system is favorable to codifi cation", a circumstance "more important than codes" themselves. Approaching the new millennium, typological experiments re-appeared in a renewed guise that associated the dedication of legal mapping with the present, while including historical developmental overviews. At the same time, they enriched the static refl ection of the past or present with an indication of the formation's dynamic motion from somewhere to somewhere. All this may have been motivated by the realisation that everything momentarily prevailing can only be interpreted as the section given at a single moment of ceaseless formation. At the same time, there is a practical need to fi nd comprehensively substantive categories expressing the directions and limits of globalising legal effects, both actual and potential. For instance, Mattei, the Italian comparatist active in the United States, made a proposition (1997) to amalgamate politics, law, and philosophical and religious tradition in one scheme of classifi cation, 43 -contrasted the West to the East, that is, the law of secular autonomous professionalism to the law of traditionalism, rigidifi ed in its past, both standing for permanence and stability as benchmarks of conceivable alignment, only in order to insert in-between that which is in fl ux, which is instable and dependent, dominated by mere politics, yet able to evolve in either of the above directions. In addition, Mattei did not even consider his scheme as a system of commensurable subjects but rather as a viewpoint or a recommendable notional approach for possible grouping. This is so because its components are seen to be in constant movement, as subjects that are not homogeneous entities but sets strained by inner confl icts, bound to diverge in various directions. For " [t] he same system may belong to the rule of traditional law if we consider family law, while belonging to the rule of professional law as far as commercial law is concerned, and to the rule of political law when we look at its criminal justice system." -polarised about the centrifugality of becoming established and the centripetality of being unestablished, and the substantiation through Western and non-Western models or impacts, at the same time. It treated Socialism as a transitional phase from the outset, an inherent product of the West, for "socialist law is culturally a European innovation […] of European Marxism", independently whether taken as generation or degeneration. 46 As to the Eastern tradition, only the Muslim and Hindu laws were specifi ed as suffi ciently established and worthy of analysis. Or, Korean, Chinese and/or Japanese Confucianism were portrayed as weakening and vanishing in law, therefore relegateable to a category with the uncertainties of Africa, and as left without doctrinal analysis. Finally, in his mixed category it is reassuringly realistic to encounter Scottish law as foreseen to change (certainly reviving again its Roman roots), Louisiana (presumably weakening in resistance to Americanisation), and Israel (as settled in multiculturality). 
Impossible Taxonomy, or the Moment of Practicality in Legal Mapping
While in theoretical legal thinking one may notice the progressive historical accumulation of philosophical-methodological foundations, legal comparatism needs, apparently as part of each step, to be restarted anew, although a major part of its literature has ever been engaged in resolving the riddle of what comparison may mean at all in law. The expressive simile that the laws' classifi cation still "fi nds itself in the condition of botany and zoology before Linnaeus and of anatomy before Cuvier" 47 highlights the unsettled nature of the preliminary issues of legal mapping. For natural objects exist as evolved timelessly and autonomously, with underlying structures forming the principle of sensible separation, describable by some physicality. In contrast, legal systems are historically forming objectivations. They evolve in various communities belonging to separate civilisations, contextualised by various cultural media, scarcely featuring anything in common. Their common denominator (or genus proximum) can only be the need for, and organisational force of, abstracting human conceptualisation on the social ideal of ordo. Or, from the variety of ways in which human organisations can be arranged with the help of various (religious, ethical, economic and political) means, that which our conventionality calls 'law' or phenomena 'embodying the law' will be selected-as differentia specifi ca-from the realisation that (a) the law is a global phenomenon by embracing the whole of society when (b) it settles (resolves) society's basic confl icts of interests (c) in its quality of serving as society's fi nal regulatory and controlling force. 48 Consequently, being a heterogeneous set resisting any taxonomy, it is exclusively the practical human need that may, if at all, force it to be classifi ed, in order that minor groups of components can be characterised as some kind of unity. Therefore, stating that grouping " [f] 49 or that it is resorted to "above all, for taxonomic reasons" 50 can at most be a fi gurative expression. We get closer to a feasible answer by simply declaring that "classifi cations are made for the purpose of simplifi cation", 51 that is, that conglomerations will be dissected into minor units with the view of rendering their heterogeneous components more manageable in practice.
Literature is clear in realising that "it is impossible to establish a uniform system of classifi cation which is ideal from every point of view and implies a clear distinction between »families« or groups". 52 In conclusion, it is not our knowledge, or initiation into scholarship, that is insuffi cient-even if this was the case before Carolus Linnaeus or Georges Cuvier, or (in describing the set of elementary material components) Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev. What is at stake here is the brutal fact that our object can only be seen as a section of incidental sets, emerged from incidental processes with incidental components, that may, its being in constant formation notwithstanding, yet be projected notionally as a fi xed block, stable enough to be subjected to systematic investigation without, however, any self-closing theory being justifi ed.
Whether the notional designation of a historical epoch, an artistic style, a group of legal systems or the implementation of any other artifi cial human ordering principle is at issue, this can only be the middle category of some comprehensive socio-cultural description, which is most suited for characterisation rather than for defi nition. 53 Any such notional designation is the conventionalised issue of classifying objects, a generation of human culture to project some sensible order. As to such designations, the dilemma whether they represent a real or an ideal type is not to be resolved by them. Likewise, it is not a sine qua non characteristic whether or not they have a reference in reality. In the sense of epistemological refl ection (or correspondence), they are not necessarily either true or false, nor need they be without alternatives. Instead, they are suitable for purposes of comprehensive typological characterisation, thanks to the classifi cation performed. Any such description is open-ending as "there can never be any fi nal proof of what is »important« or »essential«" 54 in a grouping. Therefore, the obvious fact that all such operations "are generally embedded in local cultural and social systems, and serve various social functions" 55 is neither an auxiliary feature nor mere historical coincidence but the expression of their plain practicality.
Even though categories like "cultural and legal circles" with varying "styles" may seem somewhat rudimentary, 56 nevertheless all this embodies a decisive step departing from the false objectivity of rule fetishism 57 to arrive at the law's inner understanding as a basically cultural phenomenon. This is an elementary conjecture of the recognition of law as culture, culture of thought, of ordering, etc., to foster also, among others, an interest in the comparative judicial mind. 58 In sum, in order to speak distinctively about past and present legal systems, as arranged in some groupings that may allow us to characterise their minor sets in a generalising way, fi rst we have to reckon what we are talking about at all. That is, we have to re-construct them within a typology set up for exactly such a purpose, that is, as subordinated to (quasi) class-concepts in a (quasi) logical form. This very form still will remain empty as, in want of any meta-culture suitable for derivation, there is no criterion or framework that could serve as a bridge between differing cultures. Consequently, the result of any classifying enterprise can only be some characterisation fl uctuating in terms of more or less, in the course of which we commeasure independent phenomena by provoking them to respond to questions that are alien to their specifi cs-even if making sense from some practical point of view. Or, the criticism as to the necessary defi ciency of classifi cation is in the fi nal analysis nothing but self-criticism of the presuppositions generated by the Western Utopia of rationalism, ready to logify everything within its one principled perspective. Eventually it tells less about its subject than about ourselves: the predomination of our thought by logifying rationalism and natural-science-patterned theoretical epistemology. This is one of the cases of enchantment in scholarship. For, in the fi nal analysis, we all live with some "us"-consciousness 59 and-using a double standard in classifi cations-we put "Western legal culture at the top of some implicit normative scale". 60 By the same gesture, in fact, we deprive ourselves of the "critical potential" 61 of any objective evaluation. Nevertheless, this very bias is not blameworthy. We are mapping legal systems precisely for the sake of perceiving them as contrasted to our familiar one, in the specifi c characteristics and direction that distinguish them as differing from the one we are accustomed to. Frankly speaking, it is neither a critical distance proposed by the objectivity of scientifi c description, nor an external observer's position by which we approach such arrangements that we deem to be different. Quite to the contrary, we do so in order to cognise our own better, that is to say, to compare the latter with the former, upon the basis of our own culture. So we are neither neutral nor in want of sympathy but, contrariwise, we wish simply to cognise, for ourselves, on the basis of knowledge we have acquired so far. Consequently, in the meantime, in order to know the other, too, we have to act "against the natural tendency to use without refl ection the ideals of one's own system as the normative measure". 62 Considering the extent to which the Soviet/Socialist law could come into focus during the Cold War epoch through also predominating the efforts to group legal arrangements during that period, 63 we can now regard it either as a historical accident or as a contingency of politico-scholarly considerations that almost no typology proposed that the laws of the Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism be recognised between the two World Wars, notwithstanding the fact that their expansion was spectacular, and their self-identity, rejecting and surpassing the Roman ideal of law, combative and fi rm. Maybe the torpidity
